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Although exposure to asbestos at work can give rise to incapacitating and often 
fatal diseases, there are significant obstacles for workers in claiming 
compensation for asbestos-related diseases. Such obstacles include the long 
latency of the disease, the need to establish causation many years after 
exposure, and the fact that individual workers may have been exposed to 
asbestos with multiple employers and/or in multiple jurisdictions. With the 
legacy of disease from past and present asbestos exposure expected to continue 
for some decades to come, there is a crucial need to address the obstacles to 
workers, and their families, receiving fair and adequate compensation. This 
article examines how asbestos-related diseases have been compensated in 
Australia, and how the Commonwealth, state and territory workers’ 
compensation schemes might be reformed to facilitate compensation. The 
article clarifies the often conflicting interests of workers and employers (and 
their respective representatives), discusses alternative models for compensation 
in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and explains options for national 
legislation, national uniformity or consistency in Australian schemes. The 
article evaluates alternative approaches with reference to the criteria of 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity and political acceptability, and proposes a 
strategy for reform based on uniform provisions specific to asbestos-related 
disease compensation. 
I Introduction 
Compensation with regard to dust diseases in general1 and asbestos-related 
diseases in particular, presents major challenges to the legal system. The 
principal asbestos-related diseases (asbestosis, mesothelioma and lung cancer) 
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270 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW     [VOL 34:269 
are caused by the inhalation of asbestos fibres.2 Asbestos poses a risk to health 
whenever people are exposed to these fibres and even small exposures may cause 
some types of disease.3 Asbestos diseases have long latency periods (ranging 
from 15 up to 40 years, depending on the specific disease and the circumstances 
of exposure).4 Reconstructing the facts after such a long period in order to 
establish the work-related origin of the disease (as is necessary to obtain 
workers’ compensation) is extremely difficult.5 Where the worker has been 
exposed to asbestos when working for multiple employers, perhaps in different 
jurisdictions, the challenges of establishing work-relatedness are even greater. 
The fact that not all exposure to asbestos is work related further exacerbates the 
problems, as does the genuine possibility that exposure to asbestos occurred prior 
to the current workers’ compensation legislation in the respective jurisdictions, 
in which case the preceding (and usually far less adequate) legislation may 
apply. As if this were not enough, a history of cigarette smoking may also muddy 
diagnosis, particularly for lung cancer.6
In Australia, much asbestos disease has been caused by asbestos mining, 
particularly at Wittenoom in Western Australia, but it can equally be caused by 
working with a variety of asbestos materials and products, such as asbestos-cement 
sheeting, insulation containing asbestos, brake and clutch materials, and the 
handling and transport of asbestos as a raw material.7 Many of the multiple claims 
made against James Hardie Industries relate to some of the latter operations.8 It 
follows that the mining industry has been heavily implicated as a contributor to 
asbestos-related diseases, but it should also be borne in mind that high numbers of 
claims have been made by workers employed in the railways and construction 
industries where materials containing asbestos were in common use, and in the 
maritime industry where asbestos lagging was commonly used in ships as 
insulation. Australian data for mesothelioma indicate that both the number of new 
cases diagnosed annually, and deaths, have increased steadily over the last two 
decades and, taking into account the long latency for the disease, are expected to 
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2  A R L Clark, ‘Occupational Diseases’ in John Ridley and John Channing (eds), Safety at Work
(Butterworth-Heinemann, 1999) 344, 377–8; Paul Boyce et al, ‘Respiratory Disorders’ in Barry 
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peak in the course of the next decade. The latest available data indicate there were 
579 new cases in 2006 and 551 deaths in 2007.9
This article examines how asbestos-related diseases have been and should 
be compensated in Australia, with a focus on workers’ compensation rather than 
common law. While much has been written about the latter, particularly in the 
context of the recent and ongoing litigation against the James Hardie Group,10 very 
little has been written concerning the multiple deficiencies of the workers’ 
compensation system, as it relates to diseases with long latency periods, yet this 
may prove far more important to many asbestos-damaged workers than fault-
related liability. 
This article seeks to redress the balance. Part II provides a historical context 
and surveys current legal provisions with regard to compensation for asbestos-
related diseases. Part III explores the main opportunities for reform, with a focus 
on asbestos-related disease. It begins by identifying criteria against which ‘success’ 
can be measured, before making international comparisons with the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand compensation schemes, exploring less ambitious 
reforms in terms of harmonisation of workers’ compensation arrangements across 
Australia, and considering whether a narrower, asbestos-specific and highly 
targeted approach to reform would meet the criteria for success. 
Desktop research and analysis was complemented by telephone interviews 
with representatives of jurisdictions and by face-to-face discussions at the Dust 
Diseases Board of NSW, which has played an influential role in developing 
alternative procedures for dealing with such diseases.  
II  Workers’ Compensation for Asbestos-Related Disease 
Workers’ compensation legislation in Australia was adopted by each jurisdiction 
in the early years of the 20th century, based in very large part on what was then 
the British model. The distinctive feature of this approach was to provide no-
fault compensation with regard to work-related injury (and subsequently 
disease). This approach served to mitigate the manifest limitations of common 
law liability, which was narrowly interpreted by the courts of that era, and 
extremely difficult to establish.11
On the one hand, this approach had the considerable attraction that 
compensation was automatic (without the necessity for long, costly and uncertain 
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Critique of Tort Liability as a System of Personal Injury Compensation (Staple Press, 1967); 
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litigation) provided the injury was demonstrably work related and there was 
incapacity arising from the diagnosed work-related condition. On the other hand, 
the compensation provided (in contrast to common law negligence) was less 
adequate, generally covering loss of earning capacity and medical costs but not 
non-pecuniary loss (eg pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life). In most 
instances, workers compensation schemes in Australia also provided some form of 
maximum payment schedule, whereas the common law allows for an open-ended 
assessment at the discretion of the court. Finally, it should be noted that if injured 
workers elect to pursue common law damages, they may have to reimburse their 
employers or workers’ compensation authorities for any statutory benefits paid out. 
In its original form, workers’ compensation addressed some of the worst 
excesses of the industrial revolution in the industries in which they were most 
visible. The original United Kingdom Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897, 60 & 
61 Vict, c 37 (‘Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897’) was limited in scope and only 
covered particular industries such as railways, mining and quarrying, factories and 
laundries. This template was later followed in Australia, with the early workers’ 
compensation legislation in South Australia and Western Australia similarly 
focused on dangerous industries. The mining industry was particularly prominent 
and from relatively early on, special consideration was given to the kinds of 
diseases contracted in mining, such as silicosis and chronic bronchitis. Later, when 
the link between exposure to asbestos and a number of diseases became apparent, 
it was a natural extension of the approach to treat it as a compensable industrial 
disease.12
However, asbestos-related disease has some distinctive features that 
merited, not just its inclusion in workers’ compensation schemes as a work-related 
disease, but also the inclusion of special conditions to address it. In particular, the 
outcome for a worker who contracts such a disease is frequently terminal, and 
almost invariably severely incapacitating. In the case of mesothelioma, the time 
between diagnosis and death is particularly short, making speedy processing of the 
claim and decision-making essential. Proving that such a condition was attributable 
to any particular employer is also exceptionally difficult for reasons described 
above, and this was especially the case in the mining industry, where workers were 
highly mobile and had frequently worked for a range of employers in asbestos-
related work.  
It was only belatedly, and in response to external pressure, that jurisdictions 
began to appreciate the inappropriateness and unfairness of applying provisions 
initially designed specifically for work related injury. Gradually, definitions were 
broadened to take account of work-related disease in general, and of asbestos-
related diseases with their long latency periods, gradual onset and other distinctive 
characteristics.13 Provisions designed for work-related injury traditionally require 
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12  See Kevin Purse, ‘The Evolution of Workers’ Compensation Policy in Australia’ (2005) 14 Health 
Sociology Review 8. 
13  Diseases present particular problems for compensation schemes, particularly with questions of 
work-relatedness and evidential issues for sustaining a claim. The response has sometimes been to 
enact separate statutory schemes or have special provisions for particular diseases within the 
primary workers’ compensation statute. See Alan Clayton, Richard Johnstone and Sonya Sceats, 
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proof of specific identifiable trauma which is inappropriate for occupational 
disease.
When the jurisdictions finally came to make special provision for asbestos-
related disease, each went about it largely in its own way, albeit often consistent 
with its own particular workers’ compensation arrangements, but certainly not with 
those of other jurisdictions. The remainder of this section describes the main 
differences between the jurisdictions’ provisions with regard to a number of issues 
important to workers seeking compensation for asbestos-related disease. From this 
account, the need for reform will become readily apparent.  
In terms of work-relatedness and evidential issues for sustaining a claim, 
legislation in the majority of jurisdictions contains a general presumption that 
where a worker suffers from an asbestos-related disease and the worker’s 
employment has involved exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibres, this 
employment contributed to a substantial degree to the disease. The onus is on the 
employer to provide evidence to the contrary in order to rebut the presumption.14 In 
contrast, the legislation in Queensland contains no such presumption, simply 
requiring that the worker’s employment was a ‘significant contributing factor’ to 
the worker’s contraction of the disease.15 This puts the onus on the worker to show 
that the condition from which they suffer is work related. The result is that workers 
in Queensland are substantially disadvantaged in seeking compensation. 
The legislation in New South Wales takes a different approach again. The 
schedule of dust diseases is comprehensive, including all asbestos-related diseases, 
and listing asbestosis, asbestos-induced carcinoma, asbestos-related pleural 
diseases and mesothelioma,16 and a person is entitled to compensation where he or 
she has a dust disease that is ‘reasonably attributable to the person’s exposure to 
the inhalation of dust in an occupation to the nature of which the disease was 
due’.17 The Dust Diseases Board of NSW’s industrial history officers also help 
claimants to complete forms, and compile an industrial history of past employment 
and exposure to dust.18 Preparation of industrial histories and assessment of likely 
exposure in particular employment is also facilitated by the board’s databases of 
industrial histories and dust exposure collected over many years.19
There is currently no uniformity between the jurisdictions with regard to
who undertakes diagnosis. In Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South 
Australia and Tasmania, initial diagnosis is undertaken by a medical practitioner; 
secondary diagnosis is undertaken by an independent medical practitioner; and, if 
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‘The Legal Concept of Work-Related Injury and Disease in Australian OHS and Workers’ 
Compensation Systems’ (2002) 15 Australian Journal of Labour Law 105, 120–1. 
14  See, eg, Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 31(2), sch 3; Dust Diseases 
Act 2005  (SA) s 8. See also Clayton, Johnstone and Sceats, above n 13, 120. 
15 Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003  (Qld) s 32  
16 Workers’ Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW) sch 1). 
17  Ibid s 8(1). 
18  Workers’ Compensation Dust Diseases Board of NSW, Making a Claim <http://www.ddb.nsw.gov. 
au/MakingaClaim>  
19  Workers’ Compensation Dust Diseases Board of NSW, Annual Report 2003–2004 (30 June 2004) 32–3. 
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required, final diagnosis is undertaken by a medical panel.20 The ACT has a 
substantially similar process, while the Northern Territory and the Commonwealth 
prescribe the same two first steps but make no mention of the third.21 New South 
Wales technically only provides for diagnosis to be undertaken by a medical board 
consisting of three medical practitioners, although this is not actual practice.22
Again, the result is that workers in some jurisdictions are disadvantaged compared 
with those in others. 
Nor is there any uniformity with regard to specifying how diagnosis is to be 
undertaken. In the majority of jurisdictions, guidance is provided to medical panels 
only.23 Different approaches are taken in the Northern Territory where the 
legislation gives basic guidance about secondary diagnosis; in the ACT where 
general guidance is given to all doctors conducting medical assessments; and in the 
Commonwealth legislation, which is silent about diagnosis.24 The New South 
Wales legislation provides no formal guidance about diagnosis but specific 
processes have been developed to guide the undertaking of final diagnosis.25 The 
guidance provided also varies markedly between jurisdictions. The result is 
considerable uncertainty for workers seeking compensation, both in terms of the 
law, and in terms of the actual practices of boards and other decision-makers. 
With regard to guidelines for certifying the nature and degree of the 
worker’s impairment, again there is considerable variation, and such variation 
extends to the types of questions which medical panels are either required or 
empowered to address. This in itself is a delicate question since medical matters 
can often involve some issue of fact. For example, with work-relatedness matters, a 
medical panel may, in effect, be asked to accept certain facts upon which diagnosis 
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20  See Accident Compensation Act 1985  (Vic) ss 45, 63(2), 67(2), 103, 112; Workers’ Compensation 
and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss132, 135, 179, 493, 500, 505, 510; Workers’ Compensation 
and Injury Management Act 1981  (WA) ss 36, 64; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
1986 (SA) ss 98, 98A, 98F, 98G, 108; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988  (Tas) 
ss 39(3)(b), 49, 50(5), 90A. 
21 Workers’ Compensation Act 1951  (ACT) ss 72, 116, 201; Workers’ Compensation Regulations 
2002 (ACT) reg 9, 10, 13, 14; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2008  (NT) ss 12, 
82, 90B, 91; Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 54(2), 57(1)(b)  
22  See Workers’ Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW) ss 7–8. Note that a two-stage 
process for diagnosis has developed that is not specifically prescribed by legislation. Initial 
diagnosis is undertaken by the worker’s general practitioner, who then refers the worker to a 
medical specialist for further diagnosis. Testing is then undertaken by the Dusts Disease Board’s 
in-house medical section, with final diagnosis by a medical panel.  
23  See Dust Diseases Board of NSW, Respiratory Medical Examinations Fact Sheet (Nos 1 and 2) < 
http://www.ddb.nsw.gov.au/Publications/Pages/default.aspx >; Accident Compensation Act 1985
(Vic) ss 65, 68; Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 510 (1) and (1A); 
Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) ss 98G(1)-(4), 98G(6), 98(3); Workers’ 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas) s 54. 
24 Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2008 (NT) s 94(1), 96; Workers’ Compensation 
Regulations 2002 (ACT) rr 9, 15.  
25  When a claimant attends the Dust Disease Board’s medical section, three forms of assessment may 
be performed: x-rays of lungs; a lung function test; and a medical consultation. If a claimant is 
unable to attend the Dust Diseases Board, arrangements are made for a designated local doctor to 
administer these tests. 
2012]  ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION    275 
is based.26 Whether medical panels should have authority to address such issues or 
whether they should be within the sole jurisdiction of a court is a moot question. In 
jurisdictions where factual matters are in effect referred to medical panels then 
workers may effectively be denied a proper hearing — often resulting in appeals 
and prerogative writs to overturn the panels. To add to the confusion, a number of 
jurisdictions do not make any reference to the rules of evidence to be adopted in 
diagnosis. For example, the Victorian, South Australian, Western Australian and 
Tasmanian Acts state that their medical panels are not bound by the rules or 
practices as to evidence, and furthermore, that they may act informally, without 
regard to technicalities or legal forms.27
The result is that there is considerable inconsistency between the way 
jurisdictions approach issues of diagnosis and in their processes and procedures. 
This is unfortunate and means workers in some jurisdictions are in a substantially 
worse situation than those in others. This inconsistency has particularly adverse 
implications for those who have engaged in asbestos-related work in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
Mechanisms for providing administrative ease for claimants, thereby 
facilitating efficient and timely provision of compensation, have progressed 
substantially over the years, as it has become increasingly recognised that many of 
those seeking compensation for asbestos-related disease (especially mesothelioma 
victims) may have only a very short life expectancy. Nevertheless, jurisdictions 
report significant variation in terms of the timely and efficient provision of 
compensation with the result that once again, workers in some jurisdictions are 
unjustifiably disadvantaged.  
There are three different approaches to the time in which an injured worker 
has to bring a claim for statutory compensation under the main workers’ 
compensation schemes. Some jurisdictions set no time limit,28 others set strict time 
limits but generally waive them for certain conditions or circumstances,29 while a 
third group simply require workers to report their injury ‘as soon as practicable’ 
after they become aware of the injury.30 Turning to common law, there are broadly 
two ways in which the civil liability and limitation Acts of the various jurisdictions 
deal with actions for damages regarding asbestos-related diseases. New South 

26   See, Ansett Australia Ltd v Medical Assessment Panel (1998) 19 WAR 395, 9, where the court 
noted that ‘it would be a little surprising if the legislature had intended that issues such as causation 
could be decided by the [medical] Panel …’. 
27  See Accident Compensation Act 1985  (Vic) s 65(1)-(2); Workers’ Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 98A(1)-(2); Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 
1981   (WA) s 145D; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas) s 55. See also 
Masters v McCubbery [1996] 1 VR 635 which discusses this issue, and Weearappah v Nisselle 
[1999] VSC 249 (2 July 1999). 
28 Workers’ Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW); Workers’ Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld); Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 Act (WA). 
29 Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) s 102; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 
(SA) ss 51(1)(a), 52(3)(b); Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas) ss 3(5), 32, 
38; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2008 (NT) s 182; Workers’ Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2008 (ACT) ss 27, 120, 120A. 
30 Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 53; Seafarers Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) s 52. 
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Wales, Victoria and Queensland simply exclude such injuries from the operation of 
their respective civil liability or limitation Acts.31 The remaining jurisdictions, with 
the exception of South Australia and the Northern Territory,32 prescribe that the 
relevant limitation period does not begin to run until the injury comes to the 
person’s knowledge, or when it ought to have come to their knowledge (the date of 
discoverability).33 The result, both with regard to workers compensation and to 
common law, is disparities in time limits for bringing claims in different 
jurisdictions that cannot be justified on any rational grounds. 
In terms of the availability of common law damages, the position has 
changed significantly in the last two decades with the enactment of provisions that 
have sought to roll back both the circumstances in which common law claims can 
be made34 and damages awarded in each case.35 Some jurisdictions have abolished 
the right to access common law, or introduced threshold tests,36 and/or placed 
restrictions on types of damages that an injured worker can receive, and/or placed 
caps on the amount of damages that can be awarded.37 However, in Queensland 
and the Australian Capital Territory access to common law actions is not limited 
for personal injury claims generally, and in New South Wales such actions are not 
limited for dust diseases.38 As a consequence, workers in these jurisdictions are in 
a better position than workers elsewhere.39
Turning to incapacity benefits, step downs and age limits, almost all 
jurisdictions provide for a period of near-full income replacement of pre-injury 
earnings for workers who cannot earn due to a work-related injury.40 These weekly 
income replacements are ‘stepped down’ by a percentage or a set amount after a 

31 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)s 3B (but see also Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) s12A; 
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 8(2)); Limitations of Actions Act 1936  (Vic) s 27B(2); Limitation Act
1974 (Qld).  
32  South Australia abolished access to common law claims by workers against employers in 1992, (Workers 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 54), as did the Northern Territory in 1987 (Work 
Health Act 1986 (NT) s 54), and see Safe Work Australia, ‘Comparison of Workers’ Compensation 
Arrangements in Australia and New Zealand’ (2010) Commonwealth of Australia: 14, 21. 
33 Limitation Act 2005  (WA) ss 6(2), 13, 56; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) ss 2(1), 5, 5A 38; Limitation 
Act 1985 s 16B(2). 
34  For example, a worker who has an asbestos-related condition arising from asbestos exposure in 
Victoria must satisfy a ‘serious injury’ threshold in order to claim damages: Accident
Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) ss 134 AB (38), 135A (19). 
35  Australian jurisdictions have implemented tort reform measures that have had the effect of limiting 
access to the tort system and capping various heads of damages. See, Alan Clayton, ‘Some 
Reflections on the Woodhouse and ACC Legacy’ (2003) 34 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 449.
36  Note that asbestos claims usually easily reach the common law threshold in the jurisdictions which 
have them, so they are rarely a constraint on claims. 
37  Safe Work Australia, ‘Comparison of Workers’ Compensation Arrangements in Australia and New 
Zealand’ (Report, 2010) 181–6. 
38 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3B. 
39  However, some statutes have been amended to make it easier for asbestos victims to make claims 
within the thresholds or limits for such claims. See, eg, the Asbestos Disease Compensation Act 
2008 (Vic), which contains provisions to facilitate lodgement of common law claims by workers 
with asbestos-related conditions, to enable individuals to pursue an initial claim and a further claim 
if they develop a subsequent asbestos-related condition, and to ensure that the ‘serious injury’ 
requirements are satisfied and that damages are recoverable from the deceased’s estate. 
40  For a comparison of these benefits generally see Safe Work Australia, above n 37, 33–9. 
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determined period. Most jurisdictions also place an age limit on the receipt of such 
payments. As asbestos-related diseases typically have long latency periods and 
workers will often be beyond the age of retirement before they begin to show 
symptoms of an affliction, these age limitations are especially significant. Western 
Australia, however, exempts those workers who are suffering from mesothelioma 
or pneumoconiosis41 from the age limit.42 The New South Wales scheme also 
differs, setting no age limit and thereby allowing workers suffering from asbestos-
related disease to receive weekly benefits until their death.43 Once again, the result 
is significant variation between the provisions of different jurisdictions with no 
rational basis.
Finally, asbestos victims, like all other claimants, find that their entitlements 
and benefits are determined by sometimes arbitrary differences between the 
provisions of different jurisdictions. Here is not the place for a detailed exposition 
of such differences. Suffice to say, that although the 10 principal workers’ 
compensation schemes in Australia have common objectives (adequate financial 
compensation, appropriate rehabilitation and return to work, affordable premiums 
and full funding by employers), workers making claims against employers in 
different jurisdictions confront variations in the degree of access to common law, 
work-related tests, rehabilitation and return-to-work requirements. In addition, 
employers operating across state and territory borders face significant compliance 
burdens and costs from dealing with multiple workers compensation schemes.44
The overall result both with regard to workers compensation in general and 
to asbestos-related disease in particular, is that 11 different jurisdictions (three in 
the Commonwealth and one in each state and territory) have their own systems 
with only limited commonality. Very little of this variation can be justified in 
terms of any overall principle. These jurisdictional differences have a number of 
important implications and they are of profound significance to the substantial 
numbers of itinerant workers who may find that, because they have been exposed 
to asbestos in a number of jurisdictions, they must make a claim in more than one 
court.
III Towards Reform 
A  Identifying Goals  
Since the mid 1970s (beginning with the 1974 Woodhouse Report)45 there have 
been regular calls for radical changes to be made to Australia’s approach to 
compensation for work-related injury and disease.46 Notwithstanding significant 

41  Asbestosis is a type of pneumoconiosis. 
42 Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) sch 5. 
43 Workers’ Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW) s 8. 
44  Productivity Commission, National Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety 
Frameworks, Report No 27 (2004) xxii, xxv–vi. 
45 Woodhouse Report, above n 11.  
46    See, most recently and references within: Peter Hanks, Accident Compensation Act Review: Final 
Report (WorkSafe Victoria, 2008).
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modifications to that system, no fundamental change has taken place. This part 
explores the main opportunities for reform, with a focus on asbestos-related 
disease, but recognises that reform may be intimately connected in some respects 
with reform of workers’ compensation arrangements more generally. 
Such a normative exercise can only be undertaken if the criteria against 
which ‘success’ is to be measured, are clearly identified. That is, unless we are able 
to identify what successful compensation reform would look like, it will be 
impossible to know whether, or to what extent, we have achieved it.  
Developing criteria against which to evaluate social policy is a challenge 
that has increasingly occupied the minds of decision-makers and others. For 
example, the OECD has identified effectiveness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
as important indices of success, not only in its studies of economic mechanisms, 
but also more broadly.47 Many other policy-making bodies, academic think tanks 
and individual writers have come up with other similar, but far from identical 
lists.48 In the absence of any consensus on precisely what criteria a successful 
compensation strategy should satisfy, and with no value-free way of establishing 
any, it is necessary to state the criteria that will be used and why they have been 
chosen.
The first three criteria applied in this article are those that find their way 
into almost all lists. They are effectiveness with regard to social policy achieving 
its purported objectives, efficiency with regard to delivering benefits to workers at 
least cost to the state and to employers, and equity with regard to showing fairness 
in the burden-sharing among players. The fourth criterion, political acceptability, is 
also widely understood to be a necessary prerequisite to successful social policy. It 
may prove crucial in the context of workers’ compensation arrangements given the 
strong and successful resistance of most jurisdictions in the past to external 
interventions in their activities, including national uniformity initiatives. 
In attempting to translate and apply these criteria to the specific 
circumstances of asbestos-related disease the first difficulty that must be 
confronted is that workers and employers have only very limited common interests 
in this area. Even a cursory reading of the history of engagement between workers 
who had contracted asbestos-related disease and the companies who employed 
them, exposes fundamental conflicts between the two sides of industry. Not least, a 
series of damning reports and investigations have suggested that some employers 
have commonly put corporate profits ahead of workers’ health, with devastating 
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47  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’), Environmental Policy: How 
to Apply Economic Instruments (1991); OECD, Group on Economic and Environment Policy 
Integration, Expert Group on Economic Aspects of Biodiversity, Economic Incentive Measures for 
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity: Conceptual Framework and 
Guidelines for Case Studi Biological Diversity: Economic Incentive Measures for Conservation 
and Sustainable Use (1995); OECD, Making Markets Work for Biological Diversity: The Role of 
Economic Incentives Measures (1995). 
48  See, eg, Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Group, Intersectional Issues Report
(Australian Government Printing Service, 1992); Australian Manufacturing Council, Best Practice 
Environmental Regulation (1993). 
2012]  ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION    279 
consequences for the latter.49 Accordingly, workers and employers are likely to 
have substantially different views as to what ‘effectiveness’ means, and some 
modest disagreement with regard to questions of equity and efficiency. These in 
turn translate, as we will see, into broader conflicts with regard to what is 
politically acceptable.  
Turning first to the interests of workers, it is necessary to distinguish the 
issues that workers and their representatives might pursue with regard to asbestos-
related provisions specifically, from concerns with workers’ compensation 
schemes more generally. The latter have been comprehensively canvassed in 
previous reports by the Productivity Commission50 and, more recently, in the 2008 
Victorian Accident Compensation Act Review.51 Such issues need not be rehearsed 
in detail here but include workers’ compensation systems which are effective in 
paying fair and adequate benefits and also extend to sufficient, no fault 
compensation for permanent impairment and death. 
In terms of asbestos-related disease, workers and their representatives are 
likely to be most concerned about:52
x questions of diagnosis. Asbestos-related cases involve complex issues of 
diagnosis and arguably require specialists to make the appropriate medical 
judgments. There have been moves to have decisions made by medical panels 
rather than judges, but this has been done in different ways and to varying 
extents across jurisdictions. Workers therefore encounter different approaches 
to diagnosis in different jurisdictions. Uniform criteria for expert diagnosis 
would advance effectiveness, through speedy decision-making about 
entitlement to compensation, as well as equity for workers in different 
jurisdictions and those who have worked with asbestos in multiple 
jurisdictions; 
x questions of work-relatedness and evidence for sustaining a claim. 
Establishing work-relatedness is especially problematic given the long latency 
period of asbestos-related diseases, the fact that not all exposure to asbestos is 
work related, and because a worker may have worked for multiple employers 
and/or in different jurisdictions in asbestos-related work. Even if a worker has 
demonstrated work-relatedness in one jurisdiction, the worker may be 
unsuccessful in another jurisdiction where the onus of proof is more 
demanding. Workers’ interests are best served by uniform criteria for 
establishing work-relatedness which would also support effectiveness and 
equity in payment of adequate compensation;  
x administrative ease for claimants (compensation in an efficient and timely 
manner). Prompt and efficient decision-making is particularly important in 
many asbestos cases because life expectancy after diagnosis may be short. 
Expedited decision making is crucial in cases of mesothelioma where, if 
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49  See, eg, Ben Hills, Blue Murder: Two Thousand Doomed to Die — The Shocking Truth About 
Wittenoom’s Deadly Dust (Belinda Press,1989); Gideon Haigh, Asbestos House:The Secret History 
of James Hardie Industries (Scribe, 2006); Matt Peacock, Killer Company: James Hardie Exposed
(HarperCollins, 2009); Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, ‘Industry Self Regulation’ (1997) 19 
Law and Policy 363; Dunn, above n 8. 
50  Productivity Commission, above n 44. 
51  Hanks, above n 46. 
52  See, eg, ACTU Congress, ‘Future of Work: Rehabilitation and Compensation for Injured Workers 
Policy’ (Policy Statement, ACTU, 2009) 33–4. 
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decision making is protracted, the victim is likely to die before the case is 
heard and compensation awarded;  
x statute of limitations. Asbestos cases, as with other industrial diseases 
involving long latency periods, cannot be fairly and equitably dealt with under 
statute of limitations provisions that require a claim be made within a limited 
time after the cause of action arose; 
x limitations on availability of common law damages. Over the last two decades 
a number of jurisdictions have sought to limit the circumstances or the extent 
to which workers can claim common law damages, or to abolish such 
entitlements altogether. This may be a concern for workers and their 
representatives, in view of the serious and fatal consequences of asbestos-
related disease; and 
x age limits. Although almost all jurisdictions place an age limit on the receipt 
of workers’ compensation benefits, such a limit is inequitable as asbestos-
related diseases typically have long latency periods and, as such, workers will 
often be beyond the age of retirement before they begin to show symptoms of 
an affliction.  
Workers and their representatives are therefore likely to deplore the 
disparities between, and the difficulties posed by workers’ compensation 
provisions across jurisdictions, and argue for consistent provisions capable of 
effectively, efficiently and equitably delivering compensation for asbestos-related 
diseases.53 They are however likely to welcome asbestos- or dust diseases-based 
exclusions from general workers’ compensation legislation which facilitate access 
to workers’ compensation or common law damages for asbestos-related diseases.  
On the other hand, employers and their representatives, who are generally 
concerned to reduce regulatory and administrative burdens, lower compliance 
costs, and the costs of workers’ compensation insurance might welcome greater 
consistency for efficiency reasons, but not at the price of increasing the costs of 
compensating asbestos victims. They are also likely to take a very different view 
from workers with regard to exclusions provisions. For example, the exclusion of 
dust diseases from limitations relating to common law claims in New South Wales 
is a particular concern as, on one view, this may result in inflationary cost 
increases which are seen as a key driver of increased asbestos claim costs, while 
‘[t]he absence of such reforms contributes significantly to the level of 
uncertainty.’54 Employers and their representatives’ concerns about the 
effectiveness of schemes with regard to achieving affordable premiums and full 
funding, and efficiency with regard to delivering benefits to workers at least cost to 
employers, are also likely to mean that they oppose other exclusions relating to 
asbestos diseases, largely because it is in their interests to limit the range of 
circumstances in which workers will be eligible for compensation.  
Insurance companies are also unlikely to see eye to eye with workers and 
their representatives with regard to many of the above issues. They have benefited 
from the past failure of the legal system to deal with claims involving 
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53  Ibid. 
54  Stevan Girvan and Alan Smee, ‘Paying for Asbestos: Part 2’ (2005) 28(3) Australian and New 
Zealand Institute of Insurance and Finance Journal 33, 33. 
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mesothelioma where the time between diagnosis and death is short, and where only 
expedited decision-making will ensure the claim is heard before death ensues. 
They might therefore have pragmatic reasons for regretting the provisions more 
recently introduced to address this injustice and inequity.  
On the other hand, employers and workers and their representatives usually 
support mechanisms designed to reduce costs and speed up claims. These and other 
streamlining mechanisms serve to speed up the overall process (benefiting 
workers) while also reducing costs (benefiting employers). They support 
effectiveness and efficiency goals. The Dust Diseases Board of NSW is held up as 
an exemplar as it provides ‘an extremely efficient and streamlined process for the 
determination of asbestos litigation’.55
Yet even in terms of reducing costs and speeding up claims, workers’ and 
employers’ interests are not always in harmony. Perhaps the best way to short-cut 
many disputes is via the presumption of work-relatedness which, as indicated 
earlier, applies in most jurisdictions. Whether employers would support the 
extension of such a presumption (which operates in the worker’s favour) in the 
other states (NSW and Qld) is doubtful given the additional cost burden to them 
(via their insurance premiums) of a greater number of successful compensation 
claims. Again, the two sides are likely to be at odds. 
Overall then, as regards workers’ compensation and common law claims for 
asbestos-related disease, the conflicts between workers and employers in terms of 
what they might regard as efficient, effective and equitable far exceed any common 
ground. Moreover there may be tensions between these criteria. For example, there 
is a trade off between efficiency on the one hand, and due process (a part of equity) 
on the other. While some commentators assert the importance of workers having 
their claims fully presented and independently determined with proper rights of 
representation, appeal or review,56 others argue that efficiency and effectiveness 
are best served by a move away from legal determinations to medical panels from 
which there is limited or no rights of appeal.57 Similarly, there are commonly 
fundamental tensions between what is efficient, effective or equitable and the 
fourth criterion of political acceptability. As discussed below, political 
acceptability trumps the other criteria in the sense that what is not politically 
acceptable will never get beyond the policy drawing board. 
Against this backdrop, and mindful of the tensions between workers’ and 
employers’ interests and the sometimes competing claims of effectiveness, 
efficiency, equity and political acceptability, various reform options will now be 
examined. Part B examines two international examples which provided different 
approaches to compensation. Part C explores efforts to harmonise workers’ 
compensation arrangements generally across the Australian jurisdictions. Part D 
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55  S Herd, ‘Dust Diseases: Recent Developments for Asbestos Claims’ (2006) 26(2) Proctor 11. 
56  Blundell, above n 6, 429. 
57  At the heart of this problem is the referral of factual matters to medical panels which, in many 
cases, effectively denies a worker a proper hearing and results in appeals and prerogative writs to 
overturn the panels’ decisions. (Personal communication with Rob Guthrie, Curtin Business 
School, Curtin University, WA, 2 October 2011). 
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considers whether a narrower, asbestos-specific and highly targeted approach to 
reform would better meet the criteria for ‘success’. 
B  International Comparisons 
Australia’s workers’ compensation schemes are not the only possible 
arrangements for compensating workers for asbestos-related diseases. Before 
going further, it is therefore helpful to refer briefly to the approaches of two 
other western democracies with sufficiently similar legal systems to make such 
comparison appropriate — the United Kingdom and New Zealand — and to ask 
whether or to what extent it might be desirable to apply one of these models in 
the Australian context.58
The United Kingdom, having adopted a workers’ compensation system 
based on the German model by virtue of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 
(UK), modified this approach following the publication of the Beveridge Report in 
1942.59 This report recommended that all people of working age pay a weekly 
national insurance contribution to fund the provision by the state of a broad range 
of integrated benefits. Today, the Beveridge legacy includes an industrial injuries 
scheme and an extremely complex system of disablement benefits under social 
security legislation. Under this legislation, industrial diseases such as those caused 
by work-related exposure to asbestos, are listed in a schedule to the relevant 
regulations.60
Benefits paid under the arrangements in the United Kingdom are limited in 
scope and in the amounts that can be paid in any given circumstances. In the 
definitive work on this subject, Wikeley61 argues that the UK arrangements have 
largely failed victims of asbestos-related disease who experience considerable 
difficulties in having such disease recognised as work-related, and in securing 
compensation for their medically-diagnosed disease. He further demonstrates the 
arbitrary and incomplete coverage provided through the scheme, the delays in 
prescribing some asbestos-related diseases for benefit purposes, and the low 
success rates in benefit claims, suggesting that this is largely a consequence of 
differing legal and medical concepts of proof. 
Accordingly, many of those suffering serious asbestos-related disease in the 
United Kingdom, and incurring substantial pain and suffering, look to common law 
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58  Canada has problems of a similar nature to Australia with regard to compensation for asbestos-
related disease. See Katherine Lippel, ‘Workers’ Compensation for asbestos related disease in five 
Canadian provinces’ (Final Report, Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers/Canadian 
Partnership Against Cancer, February 2010). 
59  William Beveridge, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services (1942) (‘Beveridge Report’). 
60  See Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed Diseases) Regulations 1985 (UK) SI 1985/967 
with subsequent updates and amendments. The Pneumoconiosis etc (Workers’ Compensation) Act 
1979 (UK) c 41 pays lump sum payments to asbestos victims who were exposed to asbestos at 
work and who are unable to secure civil compensation. The 2008 Mesothelioma Scheme, under the 
Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008 (UK) c 6, pays a lump sum payment to 
mesothelioma sufferers who do not qualify for a payment under the 1979 Act. 
61  Nicholas Wikeley, Compensation for Industrial Disease (Ashgate, 1993). 
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remedies, either seeking damages on the basis of employer’s (or another duty 
holder’s) negligence or breach of statutory duty. This system has no shortage of 
problems. Employers need two types of insurance cover, rather than one, resulting 
in additional costs. Courts require representation of the plaintiff and defendant by 
lawyers and involve legal standards of proof. Such court actions are also unsuited 
to asbestos disease adjudication where many years have elapsed since the causative 
event(s) and processes, making reconstruction of the facts an enormously 
challenging, time consuming and expensive task. The adversarial litigation process 
also commonly involves long delays before liability is determined, because little 
effort is made to mediate and avoid the litigation process as plaintiffs’ lawyers 
routinely take the view that ‘the only effective way of obtaining proper levels of 
compensation for sufferers and their families is to pursue a policy of assertive 
litigation’.62
The evidence also suggests that many workers in the United Kingdom who 
have contracted an asbestos-related disease are reluctant to take action against 
former employers, even when they have connected their health problems to past 
working conditions. Their reasons include: the long latency period of asbestos 
diseases and the fact that many employers have gone out of business between a 
worker’s exposure to asbestos and disease diagnosis; a reluctance to risk paying 
both sides’ legal costs if a case were lost; the prospect of paying a solicitor only to 
be told there is no case to answer; loyalty to a former employer, from whom a 
worker might be receiving a small pension; discouragement as a result of the 
relevant government agency rejecting a claim for industrial benefit; and the 
variable performance of trade unions.63
Internationally, there has been considerable debate about the place of the 
common law in compensating injured workers. Critics assert that common law 
litigation is a ‘forensic lottery’ which fails to compensate large numbers of injured 
workers, entails high transaction costs (legal and administrative expenses) and long 
delays in the delivery of benefits.64 Against this, proponents argue that for cases 
involving severe disablement and premature death (as with asbestos disease), 
common law actions provide larger payouts because they allow for assessment of 
damages commensurate with plaintiffs’ circumstances,65 and need not be 
protracted if they are settled with regard to precedents set in earlier cases.66

62  Ian McFall, quoted in J Robins, ‘Mesothelioma: Dust Cloud’ (2007) 3 Law Society Gazette 42. 
However, it must also be said that most so-called plaintiff lawyers well appreciate the risks of 
going to trial and the costs of litigation. In many instances, their clients are risk-averse and do not 
have the resources to proceed with long-term litigation. See generally Marc Galanter, ‘Why the 
“Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Society 
Review 95 and Rob Guthrie ‘Negotiation, Power in Conciliation and Review of Compensation 
Claims’ (2002) 24 Law and Policy 229. 
63 Laurie Kazan-Allen, Asbestos Compensation in Europe (7 July 2000) International Ban Asbestos 
Secretariat  < http://ibasecretariat.org/lka_eu_comp.php >.
64  See,eg, Clayton, above n 35, 461. 
65  See, eg, Girvan and Smee, above n 54.  
66  This has been the case in Australia, where many legal actions involving asbestos exposure at 
Wittenoom have been settled based on earlier cases. See, Tim Hammond, Asbestos Litigation in 
Australia: Past Trends and Future Directions Clyde Bank Asbestos Group 
<http://www.clydebankasbestos.org/gac2004/ English/pl_5_05_e.pdf >. 
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In the UK, some of the weaknesses of the common law litigation with 
regard to asbestos disease have been addressed in the Compensation Act 2006.
(UK) c29.67 For example, s 3 addresses the situation of persons who, as a result of 
their negligence or breach of statutory duty, have caused or permitted another 
person to be exposed to asbestos. The Act provides that irrespective of the fact that 
it is not possible to determine whether it was this or another exposure which 
caused mesothelioma, that person will be liable. The effect is that the claimant can 
recover full compensation from any negligent employer.68
Overall, however, it is unlikely that the arrangements for compensation for 
asbestos disease in the United Kingdom remotely approximate best practice, based 
as they are on the much criticised and limited system of the industrial injuries and 
disablement benefits in conjunction with common law liability. The UK 
arrangements would not constitute an advance on the current Australian workers’ 
compensation schemes and have therefore not been proposed as a reform option in 
the Australian context.  
The second case for comparison is New Zealand, where a radically different 
approach to compensation was taken following the recommendations of the 1967 
Woodhouse Report.69 This involves a comprehensive, no-fault accident 
compensation scheme which provides 24-hour coverage for personal injury 
generally, and not merely for work-related injury or disease. That is, all personal 
injuries are compensated, regardless of their origin, under an approach seeking to 
incorporate community responsibility, comprehensive entitlement, complete 
rehabilitation, real compensation and administrative efficiency.70 Common law 
actions for personal injury are also precluded. Details of the original Accident 
Compensation Act 1972 (NZ), and subsequent legislative iterations and 
modifications, which include funding, experience rating and rehabilitation, are 
widely available and need not be repeated here.71
For present purposes, it should be emphasised that in terms of asbestos-
related disease, the position is not as satisfactory as it is in other respects. The 
Accident Compensation Act and its successors are limited in application to 
‘personal injury’. As a consequence, the current legislation, the Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 (NZ), excludes ‘personal injury caused 
wholly or substantially by a gradual process, disease or infection’.72 However, 
there is an exception whereby ‘personal injury’ extends to a gradual process, 
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67  For the circumstances leading up to the introduction of the 2006 reforms, see Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] 1 AC 32; Barker v Corus [2006] 2 AC 572. 
68  In November 2009, the Court of Appeal examined the impact of the Compensation Act 2006 (UK) 
c 29 on the existing common law rules with regard to the work-relatedness of mesothelioma. In 
Sienkiewicz v Greif [2010] QB 370, the court held that the correct test for work-relatedness in such 
cases is whether the tortious act of the defendant materially increased the risk of the claimant 
contracting mesothelioma, in that the increase was more than minimal. See T Bennett, ‘Material 
Increase in Risk of Mesothelioma under Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006’ (2009) 
25Professional Negligence 210, 213. 
69  New Zealand, Royal Commission to Inquire into and Report upon Workers’ Compensation, 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (1967). 
70  See, generally, Clayton, above n 35. 
71  Industry Commission, Workers’ Compensation in Australia, Report No 36 (1994), app E, E23–E 26. 
72 Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 (NZ) s 26. 
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disease or infection that is work-related, a treatment injury or consequential on 
personal injury…for which the person has cover.73 Accordingly, asbestos-related 
diseases are covered to the extent that they fall within the above categories and 
definitions.  
In the case of asbestosis, cover will apply provided that the manner in 
which it was contracted is work-related.74 In contrast, mesothelioma, which can be 
caused by the penetration of a single asbestos fibre to the lung or pleura, as distinct 
from gradual accumulation of asbestos dust in the body, is treated as an ‘accident’ 
because it involves ‘the inhalation…[or] the oral ingestion of any…foreign object 
on a specific occasion’.75 The anomalous result is that mesothelioma sufferers can 
claim compensation irrespective of whether the disease is contracted at work or 
not, while asbestosis sufferers must prove the work-related nature of their disease.  
International commentary on the New Zealand scheme is mixed. For 
example, Clayton refers approvingly to New Zealand’s comprehensive no-fault 
scheme, compared to ‘the chaotic, inconsistent, limited and expensive mishmash of 
measures for dealing with personal injury in Australia.’76 Other commentators note 
that benefits have gradually been cut over the years, the scheme has become more 
costly to fund, and financial and political pressures have led to the scheme failing 
to achieve the social justice principles originally conceived.77 While far from 
perfect, a strong case can be made that the New Zealand approach is superior to the 
available alternatives in terms of its coverage and level of benefits.  
The current Australian workers’ compensation schemes fall somewhere 
between the UK and New Zealand systems. The Australian schemes provide 
public, universal systems that employers must pay into, under which workers with 
occupational injuries and diseases are entitled to prompt, automatic benefits 
including rehabilitation and assistance with return to work. They also have the 
merits of being no fault systems, although they limit payment of compensation to 
injuries and disease arising out of or in the course of employment, and the sums 
awarded under workers’ compensation are substantially less than at common law 
(even with legislative limitations on the circumstances in which common law 
claims can be made and caps on the amounts awarded). Nonetheless, Australian 
workers’ compensation benefits are far better than benefits under the United 
Kingdom’s industrial injuries scheme.  
The Australian schemes, however, fall short of the New Zealand scheme in 
terms of just and equitable compensation of injuries and diseases, given their 
limited breadth of coverage and the benefits available. The New Zealand scheme is 
superior in terms of efficiency as transaction costs are minimised because 
compensation is not confined to work-related injury and disease. The scheme rates 
highly on effectiveness because almost all injured persons receive the 
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73 Ibid s 20(2)(e)-(h). 
74  By virtue of Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 (NZ) s 20(2). 
75  Ibid s 25. See also Maria Hook, ‘New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme and Man-Made 
Disease’ (2008) 39 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 289. 
76  Clayton, above n 35, 462. 
77  See, eg, Bronwen Lichtenstein, ‘From Principle to Parsimony: a Critical Analysis of New 
Zealand’s No-Fault Accident Compensation Scheme’ (1999) 12 Social Justice Research 99.
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compensation intended. The scheme also rates highly on equity because it is rare 
for individual claimants, or classes of claimants, to be treated differently from 
others (although there are some exceptions, as with asbestos cases). 
Nevertheless, the New Zealand scheme scores poorly on political 
acceptability, at least from the stand point of Australia, and it is for this reason that 
there seems no possibility that any future reforms in this country will remotely 
approximate the New Zealand approach. Although an initiative to adopt the New 
Zealand model was contemplated by the Whitlam government in the 1970s,78 the 
political will to take this direction has long since been lost. This is not only 
because of the considerable cost implications of such a move, but also because of 
the threat it would pose to those with powerful and embedded vested interests who 
benefit from the regulatory status quo. There are also few, if any, powerful and 
organised advocates in favour of a scheme based on the New Zealand model, and 
those who might be injured or contract disease outside of the workplace are not 
part of any pressure group, effective or otherwise.  
Overall, whatever the benefits of the New Zealand approach, its low score 
on political acceptability mean that there seems no possibility of it being adopted 
in Australia at the present time. The remainder of this article will therefore be 
concerned with more modest reforms that might be achieved with regard to 
compensation for asbestos-related disease within the general framework of 
Australian workers’ compensation legislation.  
C  Harmonisation of Compensation Arrangements 
Within Australia, as discussed, each jurisdiction has its own arrangements for 
workers’ compensation. In international terms, this is an unusual arrangement, 
and one which has had a number of undesirable consequences. Not least, it has 
resulted in numerous inter-jurisdictional inconsistencies for which there is no 
underlying rationale.79 In the case of asbestos diseases, these concern such 
critical matters as how to establish work-relatedness and related evidentiary 
issues, limitation periods, how diagnosis is to be made, the role, powers and 
functions of medical panels, and mechanisms for providing administrative ease 
and expediting asbestos-related claims.  
The result of these numerous inconsistencies is that workers in particular 
jurisdictions are seriously disadvantaged in seeking compensation for asbestos-
related disease as compared to their peers elsewhere, generating inequities and 
incentives for forum shopping. In the past, the latter has resulted in large numbers 
of sufferers of asbestos-related disease seeking to lodge their claims before the 
Dust Diseases Board in New South Wales, rather than in jurisdictions with more 
onerous provisions. Only if issues such as the onus of proof, the role of medical 
panels and the appropriate limitations period are addressed uniformly and in ways 
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78 Woodhouse Report, above n 11. 
79  See, generally, Richard Johnstone, Occupational Health and Safety Law and Policy: Text and 
Materials (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2004) ch 10. 
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that meet the legitimate concerns of workers, as described at the beginning of this 
section, will effective and equitable outcomes be achieved. 
Employers of course, will have concerns to reduce their costs and their 
focus is likely to be on those inconsistencies that generate inefficiencies and 
impact on effectiveness with regard to scheme funding and affordability objectives. 
Inconsistencies cause unnecessary complexity, administrative burdens and 
duplication of work effort, especially for companies with operations in multiple 
jurisdictions. Many of these inconsistencies relate to workers’ compensation 
schemes generally, and disparities between asbestos-specific provisions are simply 
one manifestation of a much broader problem. That is, to the extent that employers 
drive the political debate, then it is harmonisation of the workers’ compensation 
arrangements generally that is the main game, rather than asbestos claims. 
Such system-wide concerns have driven the workers’ compensation policy 
debate for many years. Recognising the manifest shortcomings of having 11 
schemes, a number of reports have made recommendations for greater 
harmonisation, albeit not without considerable controversy. For example, an 
influential Industry Commission report in 1994 examined proposals that ranged 
from a national scheme established through a single, uniformly applied 
Commonwealth Act, to national uniformity based on all jurisdictions enacting 
uniform legislation, to achieving consistency by jurisdictions agreeing to adopt 
‘best practice’ at their own pace.80 Yet only three years later the Heads of Workers’ 
Compensation issued their own report,81 effectively undermining the Industry 
Commission recommendations, which it was feared would add another layer of 
infrastructure and administration.  
Other reports touching on the question of harmonisation of workers’ 
compensation arrangements include the Productivity Commission’s 2004 report on 
National Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety 
Frameworks82 and reports by the New South Wales,83 South Australian84 and 
Western Australian85 governments, and the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace Relations.86
The first of these reports has been especially influential, particularly in terms of its 
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80  Industry Commission, above n 71, 228. 
81  Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities, Promoting Excellence: National Consistency in 
Australian Workers’ Compensation (1997). 
82  Productivity Commission, above n 44. 
83  McKinsey and Company, ‘Partnerships for Recovery: Caring for Injured Workers and Restoring 
Financial Stability to Workers' Compensation in NSW’ (Report, McKinsaey and Company, 1 
September 2003). 
84  Brian Stanley, Frances Meredith and Rod Bishop, Review of Workers Compensation and 
Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Systems in South Australia (Department for 
Administrative and Information Services, Workplace Services, 2002). 
85  Rob Guthrie, Report on the Implementation of the Labor Party Direction Statement in Relation to 
Workers' Compensation (Government of Western Australia, 2001). 
86  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace Relations, 
Parliament of Australia, Back on the Job: Report into Aspects of Australian Workers’ 
Compensation Schemes (2003). 
288 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW     [VOL 34:269 
evaluation of possible models for establishing national frameworks for workers’ 
compensation arrangements.87
As Purse, Guthrie and Meredith88 explain, the Productivity Commission’s 
proposal was for a new system to be implemented in three discrete stages, utilising 
three different scheme design models that would progressively increase the 
availability of national workers' compensation coverage for corporate employers. 
In model A, multi-state firms that met a ‘competition’ test would be able to transfer 
from state and territory schemes to become national self-insurers, subject to 
meeting certain prudential and other criteria. In the next stage, model B, 
Commonwealth legislation would be enacted to create a new national workers’ 
compensation scheme that would provide national self-insurance coverage for all 
interested multi-state firms. Under model C, a new national scheme would be made 
available for all corporations and would provide options for both premium based 
insurance and self-insurance. These developments could also be accompanied by 
the creation of a new national body, directly accountable to the Workplace 
Relations Ministers Council, to oversee these processes.  
The Productivity Commission’s proposed approach has been criticised as 
being overwhelmingly designed to benefit large companies, with the concerns and 
interests of injured workers and small business being subordinated to this 
overriding objective, and existing state and territory schemes being subjected to 
escalating funding pressures.89 Notwithstanding such criticisms, important 
elements of the Productivity Commission’s general approach have been adopted by 
the Commonwealth government and some 29 large companies with operations in a 
number of jurisdictions have successfully sought self-insurance licences with 
Comcare and now operate under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
1988 (Cth) (‘SRC Act’) across all jurisdictions.90
Harmonisation initiatives have also been taking place through agreement 
between jurisdictions. In August 2006, the Victorian and New South Wales 
Ministers with portfolio responsibility for workers’ compensation announced 
reforms to their schemes in an effort to harmonise key administrative areas and cut 
red tape for employers operating across the country. A 10-point harmonisation plan 
was released as a part of that announcement, and this plan has since been adopted 
by eight jurisdictions.91 Although the plan involved a commitment to common 
approaches to administering premiums, compensation, OHS prevention issues and 
self insurance, while protecting the level of benefits and support provided to 
injured workers, the plan falls far short of a comprehensive approach and does 
little to rectify the many anomalies that exist with regard to specific issues such as 
asbestos-related disease. 

87  Productivity Commission, above n 44, viii. 
88  Kevin Purse, Rob Guthrie and Frances Meredith, ‘Faulty Frameworks: The Productivity 
Commission and Workers' Compensation’ (2004) 17Australian Journal of Labour Law 306. 
89  Ibid. 
90 See Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, — Current Licensees 
<http://www.srcc.gov.au/self_insurance/current_licensees >. See also Rob Guthrie, (2012) 
Insurance Law Journal, forthcoming. 
91  Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. 
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More recently, the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities has 
developed The Australian and New Zealand Workers’ Compensation Strategy 
2009-2012, which identifies a common set of objectives, principles and priority 
areas to improve workers’ compensation and injury management arrangements 
across jurisdictions. There is also a commitment to maintain fair, affordable and 
financially viable workers’ compensation schemes. Safe Work Australia has 
responsibility to guide and provide advice on the overall strategic planning and 
policy development for harmonisation of workers’ compensation arrangements.  
Given these various developments, is a national scheme for workers’ 
compensation generally, and including asbestos-related cases necessary or 
practicable? The answer would seem to be ‘no’. The principal driver for a national 
scheme is the concerns of major employers operating in different jurisdictions to 
reduce complexity and inconsistency and thereby reduce their costs. That is, 
pressure for a national scheme is largely driven by efficiency concerns. Yet these 
concerns have been met through the elegant mechanism of providing for 
companies operating interstate to obtain self-insurance licences with Comcare and 
operate under the SRC Act92 across all jurisdictions.93 Accordingly, unless the 
present government chooses to preclude such companies from obtaining licences, 
the main impediment to efficiency has already been substantively addressed in the 
absence of a national scheme.94
A national scheme is also, in all probability, not practicable, as it is likely to 
be politically unacceptable to states and territories with different political agendas 
and vested interests, which vary with the political complexion and circumstances 
confronted by the governments of the day. Moreover, because the funding 
arrangements for the states are different, the financial situation varies substantially 
between jurisdictions. It is likely that political acceptability (or the lack of it) 
would trump concerns about efficiency, effectiveness or equity. In any case, these 
criteria for success can be addressed by mechanisms other than a national scheme. 
A national scheme is not essential to rectify the various deficiencies in current 
workers’ compensation legislation generally, and for asbestos-related diseases in 
particular.95
D  Towards an Asbestos-Specific Solution 
In considering any additional harmonisation arrangements that might be 
desirable with regard to compensation for asbestos-related disease (or dust 
diseases generally) a distinction must be made between: (i) matters for which the 
principles governing compensation for such diseases do not depart materially 
from those relating to workers compensation more generally (for example, the 
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92  Note that Comcare also manages claims under the Asbestos-Related Claims (Management of 
Commonwealth Liabilities) Act (No 122) 2005 (Cth). 
93  This solution did, however, leave other questions unanswered. See, Purse Guthrie and Meredith, 
above n 88. 
94  However the SRC Act would only cover employees of licensees for asbestos-related diseases if 
exposure occurred since the employer joined the Comcare scheme. (Personal communication, Alex 
O’Shea, Comcare, 30 May 2010). 
95  I am indebted to Rob Guthrie for discussions that facilitated the following approach. 
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definition of ‘worker’ for the purposes of making a claim); and (ii) matters for 
which the principles governing compensation for such diseases do or may so
depart (for example, the onus and standard of proof with regard to diagnosis and 
work-relatedness). The former will be addressed within the context of any 
broader harmonisation process described above. The latter would need to be 
dealt with independently of that process. Key questions then are: what might that 
involve?; and, how might efficiency, effectiveness, equity and political 
acceptability, or at least some approximation to them be achieved, recognising 
that there are inevitable tensions between these criteria, and between the interests 
of workers and employers?  
To address this question, it is necessary to return to the concerns of workers 
and employers, and their respective representatives, as described at Part IIIA 
above. In terms of equity, it is manifestly unfair that workers in some jurisdictions 
should have entitlements and benefit from asbestos-specific provisions for 
determining eligibility, while those in others are greatly disadvantaged by their 
absence. It is manifestly unfair, for example, that workers in some jurisdictions 
should benefit from compensation while those in others will die in an impecunious 
state, simply because the key provisions in the respective legislation of these 
jurisdictions vary. It is in the interests of effectiveness that any changes to achieve 
greater consistency and equity, should involve a levelling up, so that all workers in 
all jurisdictions benefit from more generous entitlements and eligibility criteria, in 
order to meet the legitimate concerns of workers and their representatives outlined 
above.
In particular, there are sound policy reasons for:  
x uniformity in terms of the onus of proof, with the presumption being that 
employment was the cause of the development of an asbestos-related 
condition, at least for the asbestos-related diseases of asbestosis and 
mesothelioma. This is required given the long latency period and difficulty 
establishing work-relatedness for exposure years before. This would require 
changes to the law in any jurisdiction where it is necessary for a worker to 
prove that work was a significant contributing factor to disease (as in 
Queensland), and with regard to scheduling asbestosis and mesothelioma. 
Consistency in these areas would facilitate compensation and avoid the 
considerable inequity of existing disparities between jurisdictions; 
x all jurisdictions to adopt similar mechanisms to facilitate speedy resolution of 
claims. Most asbestos victims become severely incapacitated, some have 
terminal conditions, and mesothelioma sufferers in particular die within one or 
two years of diagnosis. Mechanisms to speed up claims resolution might 
include fast-track hearings, mediation at the earliest possible time and 
certainly prior to a main hearing, and medical panels which the evidence 
suggests are both efficient and effective in terms of diagnosis, as distinct from 
dealing with factual issues.96 For example, the Dust Diseases Board of NSW’s 
streamlined process takes into account the rapid progression of some asbestos-
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96  The referral of factual matters to medical panels effectively denies a worker a proper hearing in 
many cases, and often results in appeals and prerogative writs to overturn the panels. (Personal 
communication Rob Guthrie, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, WA. 18 June 2010). 
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related diseases and their painful and incapacitating nature, and is regarded as 
the best model to follow on this, as on a number of other issues;97
x facilitating the claims of workers who have engaged in asbestos-related work 
in more than one jurisdiction (usually also for multiple employers). This issue 
has a number of dimensions. It would involve consistent standards with regard 
to the onus of proof and the means by which proof is established to overcome 
the difficulties experienced by workers even when they have already 
established their claim in another jurisdiction. There are sound reasons to 
include a provision in each jurisdiction allowing for proof obtained in one 
jurisdiction to be accepted and adopted in another, to prevent a worker from 
having to undergo multiple medical procedures. There is also a need for 
mechanisms across jurisdictions to establish that the last employer is 
responsible for paying compensation to the worker and must then sort out with 
other past employers the relative proportion of compensation for which they 
are responsible, thereby ensuring that the worker gets compensation at a 
relatively early time. Such mechanisms currently exist within jurisdictions but 
not across jurisdictions;   
x uniform processes and procedures for medical panels, including the range of 
questions that panels are asked to address. A composite list, drawing from the 
best provisions of different states, could sensibly be developed and applied 
across the jurisdictions. Medical panels should also be required to give reasons 
for their decisions, to avoid unnecessary litigation,98 and to follow due process 
to the same extent in all jurisdictions.99 The manner in which medical panels 
provide their certificates and reasons for decisions should be the subject of 
regulations, to reduce the potential for unsubstantiated or poorly considered 
opinions, and associated litigation; 
x uniform provisions relating to limitations periods in asbestos disease cases 
(both workers’ compensation and common law). While most jurisdictions 
allow for an extension of time in respect of latent conditions and in most 
instances workers have access to common law rights even if the diagnosis of 
their medical conditions arises many years after their exposure, such 
provisions should be consistent across all jurisdictions, and drafted so as to 
take account of the special circumstances of asbestos-related disease; and 
x modifying the age restriction. Asbestos-related diseases are exceptional 
because they typically have long latency periods and, as such, workers will 
often be beyond the age of retirement before they show symptoms of disease. 
Accordingly there is an argument for exempting asbestos claims from the age 
limit that applies to incapacity benefits in workers’ compensation generally, as 
has been done for dust diseases in New South Wales.  
So far, this discussion has made a series of proposals that would largely 
achieve equity and effectiveness. Efficiency, in terms of workers’ compensation 
generally, was addressed earlier, the argument being that the opportunity that 
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97  Herd, above n 55. 
98  In Victoria, Western Australia and New South Wales there has been significant litigation involving 
the question of whether or not medical panels have adequately given reasons for their opinions in 
the medical certificates that they provide. 
99  There is a trade-off between efficiency and due process, with concern expressed within the legal 
community as to the problems of taking decision-making away from independent judges and giving 
it to medical panels from which there is limited or no appeal. See Blundell, above n 6, 428–9). 
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multi-state employers have to be licensed under the Commonwealth scheme 
largely addresses this issue even in the absence of broader harmonisation. 
However, the SRC Act would only cover employees of licensees for asbestos-
related diseases if exposure occurred since the employer had joined the Comcare 
scheme.100 Since this will be very recent in the case of non-Commonwealth 
entities, coverage under Comcare will be of little use to asbestos victims, almost all 
of whose exposure will have been before this time. Short of changes to the SRC
Act to take account of this situation, which seems unlikely, given that the 
employers licensed under Comcare (as self-insurers) would be buying into 
substantial liabilities, the most obvious and desirable solution would be for the 
jurisdictions to agree on uniform (or at least consistent) provisions with regard to 
liability and the related issues identified above. 
A central issue, then, is whether these proposals for ‘contained 
harmonisation’ of asbestos-specific provisions could be successful or whether they 
might flounder on the same criterion as other proposals discussed earlier; that is, of 
political acceptability. There are strong reasons to suggest they would not, as they 
do not involve ‘big-ticket’ financial considerations. One reason why harmonisation 
has not taken place with regard to workers’ compensation schemes generally is that 
issues such as the level of weekly payments, constraints on common law liability 
and medical expenses involve major financial considerations, and amendments 
made with regard to one of these issues usually affects other issues, thereby 
threatening to unravel the whole financial spectrum of workers compensation.101
While the proposals made above with regard to asbestos-related diseases 
have some financial consequences insofar as workers may be able to prove their 
case more easily in some jurisdictions, this is unlikely to be seen by employers, 
insurers or the jurisdictions themselves as a major financial impact, as asbestos 
disease claims are not numerous. Nor would asbestos-specific provisions, which 
are essentially ‘stand alone’, entail the risk of unravelling other provisions. There 
is also widespread public sympathy for asbestos victims. Accordingly, 
harmonisation proceeding along onus of proof, evidentiary and procedural issues is 
unlikely to run into any major obstacle in terms of political acceptability.  
This still leaves open the question of how contained harmonisation of 
asbestos-specific provisions should best be achieved. The least interventionist 
approach would be to build on existing arrangements. Since multi-jurisdiction 
employers can elect to apply for a licence under Comcare (subject to continuation 
of this approach following a review of self-insurance under Comcare)102 then one 
solution is for asbestos-specific provisions to be enacted under the SRC Act as a 
model for other jurisdictions (addressing the issues and adopting the solutions 
proposed above). This would bind all Commonwealth entities and the large 
companies choosing to participate in this scheme although, as indicated earlier, the 
SRC Act would only cover employees of licensees for asbestos-related diseases if 
exposure occurred since the employer joined the Comcare scheme. Accordingly, 
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100  Personal communication with Alex O’Shea, Comcare, 30 May 2010. 
101  I am indebted to Rob Guthrie for alerting me to the implications identified in this paragraph. 
102  Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, Report of the Review of Self-
Insurance Arrangements under the Comcare Scheme (2009). 
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the ‘Commonwealth as model’ approach would only work effectively to the extent 
that other jurisdictions reform their asbestos-specific provisions on the Comcare 
model so that substantive consistency is achieved. However, change under this 
approach may be slow, proceeding in all likelihood at the rate of the most laggard 
jurisdiction, and involving piecemeal change.  
An alternative, more interventionist, model that might achieve faster change 
would be the ‘template model’. Here, the mechanism for achieving contained 
harmonisation would be agreement by Heads of Government through the Council 
of Australia Governments (‘COAG’), to adopt certain measures identified above 
with regard to claims for asbestos-related disease by uniform legislation, while 
allowing jurisdictions to retain autonomy on other elements of workers’ 
compensation legislation. Such an approach would provide access to compensation 
for workers, regardless of when their exposure to asbestos occurred. It also has the 
attraction of being consistent with the Commonwealth’s approach to harmonisation 
of OHS legislation,103 and may be more politically attractive (that is to say it might 
engender more support from jurisdictions) than the first approach, as all 
governments would participate equally in defining the asbestos-specific provisions 
through the COAG process.  
IV Conclusion 
Dust diseases in general, and asbestos-related diseases in particular, have caused 
difficulties for workers’ compensation schemes. Their long latency period, 
related challenges in establishing work-relatedness and attributing responsibility 
to particular employer(s), and the sometimes short time between diagnosis and 
death, suggest that exceptional compensation arrangements are needed. 
Yet when the Australian jurisdictions have made special provision for 
asbestos-related diseases, they have gone about it in their own ways, consistent 
with their own particular workers’ compensation arrangements, but not with those 
of others. 
In broad terms, compensation for asbestos-related disease should be 
efficient, effective, equitable and politically acceptable. Manifestly, it is not. There 
are substantial disparities between the provisions of different jurisdictions with 
regard to such critical matters as: how to establish work-relatedness and related 
evidentiary issues; limitation periods; how diagnosis is to be made; the role, 
powers and functions of medical panels; mechanisms concerned to expedite 
asbestos-related claims; and mechanisms enabling benefits to be claimed beyond 
the age of retirement.  
The result is that workers in some jurisdictions are substantially 
disadvantaged in seeking compensation as compared to those in others. Those who 

103  The Council of Australian Governments formally committed to the harmonisation of work health 
and safety laws by signing an inter-governmental agreement. See, Council of Australian 
Governments, Inter-Governmental Agreement (the IGA) for Regulatory and Operational Reform in 
Occupational Health and Safety (2008). Subsequently a model Work Health and Safety Act was 
developed which all jurisdictions except Western Australia have agreed to adopt. 
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have worked in asbestos-related work in multiple jurisdictions are particularly 
disadvantaged. On some matters there is also considerable uncertainty both in 
terms of law and actual practices of decision-making bodies. This too, puts 
workers in some jurisdictions in a worse situation than those in others.  
International comparisons are of limited value in addressing how the current 
arrangements might be reshaped. The UK’s arrangements would not represent an 
advance on current Australian schemes, and there seems no possibility of New 
Zealand’s radically different approach of 24-hour coverage being adopted as it is 
unlikely to have political traction in Australia at the present time.104 In contrast, a 
reshaping of asbestos-related provisions within the general framework of 
Australian workers’ compensation legislation seems much more plausible. 
Such reshaping need not be dependent upon any national harmonisation 
initiative across workers’ compensation systems generally as there is no 
impediment to reforms targeted specifically at compensation for asbestos-related 
disease under the current schemes. The changes needed to rectify the injustices of 
current arrangements for compensating asbestos-related disease could be made 
independent of any broader harmonisation process.  
As has been argued, there are compelling policy reasons for each of the 
Australian jurisdictions to adopt consistent provisions ensuring: uniformity in 
terms of the onus of proof; speedy resolution of claims; ready establishment of 
liability where the worker may have worked for multiple employers in asbestos-
related work; proof obtained in one jurisdiction is accepted in another jurisdiction; 
the claims of workers who have engaged in asbestos-related work in more than one 
jurisdiction are processed expeditiously; uniformity of the processes and 
procedures of medical panels, including the range of questions they are asked to 
address; consistency in the manner in which medical panels provide their 
certificates and reasons for decisions; and exemptions from limitations periods and 
from provisions relating to cessation of benefits at retirement age, in asbestos-
related disease cases. 
Finally, it is important to recognise that many of the issues raised in this 
article concerning compensation for asbestos-related disease pertain to the area of 
occupational disease more generally, albeit that the current compensation 
arrangements with regard to asbestos may be seen as a particularly egregious 
example of more general failings. 
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104  But see, Productivity Commission, Disability Care and Support: Public Inquiry (27 March 2012), 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/disability-support> where suggestions were made to move 
in the direction of the New Zealand approach. 
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